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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
FUTURE'
Does one not commit an anachronism in writing on the sub-
ject of Private International Law at a time when war is raging
round about us? When the attention of everyone is naturally
directed towards the great events which interest us powerfully
and, alas, fill our hearts with gloom, can there-should there
remain in our minds room for the peaceful problems arising
from a plurality of laws and the facts of international com-
merce? Foresight is necessary, however, and to foresee is the
duty of the jurist as well as of the true statesman, and in this
matter the duty of foresight is all the more imperative as the
new world that will arise from the tornado that has shaken
Europe for nearly three years will differ in many respects from
the world in which we have lived. Certain of these changes
are already so probable as to border upon certainty, to one of
which I should like to call the attention of the readers of this
JOURNAL.
I regard it as certain that the end of the war will bring about
a noticeable rapprochement between certain nations which have
remained, heretofore, very distant toward each other. Is it
necessary for me to indicate here that I do not mean to allude
Translated from the French by Dr. Ernest G. Lorenzen, Professor of
Law in the University of Minnesota; Professor-elect in the Yale
University School of Law.
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to any plan whatsoever for the reconstruction of society on a
rational basis? The persons who do me the honor of reading
these lines well know that I regard all projects of this sort as
so many idle fancies which cannot be realized. The contem-
poraneous events, since and inclusive of the Hague Conferences,
have only confirmed these views. But when I see, during this
wai, volunteers from" the four corners of the globe, rallying
around the flags of the Powers which have the honor of fight-
ing for justice and for the liberty of mankind, and colonies
giving their men and money to their mother country unreservedly,
I say that the defense of a good cause is not a vain word and
that there exists still in the universe a sufficient understanding of
good and evil.
The bloody seed will bring its harvest. Do you think that
our children and our grandchildren will forget the aid so liberally
given to our wounded by the citizens of the United States and
those consignments of food without which the Belgians, as well
as the French people of the North, would have died of misery?
Surely the greatest accomplishments in the national life of a
people are achieved through sentiment, and the remembrance of
these kind acts will be effective and lasting because they involve
sentiment. Unless I am very much mistaken, the United States
will be for the French people after the war, no longer what they
were before the war-a people distant from ours with whom
commercial dealings were above all desirable-but a nation of
true friends, of men of heart, whose nobility has been tested
in days of adversity, a people whose esteem we desire to retain,
and for whom we shall have henceforth the greatest respect.
This is only one notable example. There are others which war-
rant the assertion that between certain peoples the international
life will revive with an intensity which it never had before. It is
probable that we shall witness then two series of phenomena,
the one contrary to the other-a marked separation on the one
hand and a constant approach on the other. Let us consider only
this approach. There is no doubt that it will increase the task
imposed upon Private International Law. The task was already
considerable and difficult, and it will become still more so.
I
Here I put the question which I desire to answer: Is the
actual Private International Law sufficient to meet these new
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needs? No, it certainly is not, and it must be transformed.
The spirit which animated it and the ideal which it pursued
have now been found to be irreconcilable with the necessities of
the life of the peoples. Since the middle of the nineteenth century,
the period in which the first of the new doctrines of Private
International Law came to light, their development has been in
the direction of an almost unlimited cosmopolitanism. It was
assumed that the mission of this science was not only to aid in
the good administration of private justice among the nations,
but that it should lower also, by degrees, the barriers separat-
ing subjects from aliens, so as to make of all inhabitants of the
civilized countries one people with a view to subjecting them
gradually to the same institutions. Hence, the tendency to favor
changes in nationality; hence the avowed determination to sup-
press all differences in the civil status of aliens and subjects;
hence, also, the growing frequency of those great conventions
which aim to establish, to an appreciable extent, uniformity of
legislation.
We believed that progress was to be found in that direction.
We all shared, more or less, this mistake, and I am well aware
that there are pages in my writings to which I would no longer
subscribe. One painful experience has undeceived us. We com-
mitted the two-fold mistake of thinking that the juridical conse-
quences attached to the idea of nationality could be weakened
without danger and of failing to see that the same rigime of
law does not equally suit all nations. We now know that a
people grows stronger by birth and not by naturalization.
Equality between subjects and aliens is with us no longer a
dogma. The great Conventions have not justified the high hopes
reposed in them. The spirit of cosmopolitanism is therefore
dead. Warned by experience, the people will be resolutely
nationalists. They will live by themselves knowing that by
seeking too much foreign collaboration they incur the risk of
ending in servitude.
What will be the effect of the new orientation of the public
mind upon our science? In my opinion it will bring about a
more complete separation between the two great problems with
which Private International Law deals-that of the status of
aliens, and that of the solution of the Conflict of Laws. The
problem of the status of aliens is, in reality, not a part of our
international science, at least not an essential part. In this branch
of the law the influence of foreign laws will doubtless be almost
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nil.2 If the question be asked within what limits shall a state
open its doors to the alien, whether it shall grant to him the same
rights which it accords to its own subjects, or whether it shall
keep him in this regard, in a state of inequality, one is forced
to recognize that each state has the right to decide the question
as it may deem best without concerning itself about what the
others may do. A decided tendency toward liberalism was
noticeable, however, in the juristic writings. The ideal appeared
to be contained in Article 3 of the Italian Civil Code which
assimilates aliens with subjects as regard9 the enjoyment of
private rights, and he who would have pronounced this idea
dangerous and would have suggested its banishment from our
laws would have received little thanks. And yet such a person
would have been right. To-day it is no longer disputable that
a too liberal welcome extended to aliens is the source of very
serious danger to a country; for groups of numerous and power-
ful aliens create a harmful atmosphere about themselves in the
country which harbors them, their industry threatens its industry,
their riches constitute its poverty, their patriotism degenerates
sometimes into habits of espionage, into constant plots, and the
time comes quickly when nobody is powerful enough to stop
these odious practices.
The state must have a free hand. It must examine cautiously
what limits must be set to the hospitality which it consents t6
extend to aliens, whether individuals, partnerships or corpora-
tions. Perhaps it will impose upon them certain incapacities, or
subject them to certain taxes. It will doubtless subject them
to police regulations which will be minute, but not vexatious.
In doing so it will not exceed its right and will injure no one.
It is not a question of reducing aliens once more to a kind of
servitude which was their original condition, nor through a
revival of the right of aubaine (escheat) to prevent their inherit-
ing property from, or leaving property to, their relatives upon
death. The problem is to avoid the danger which the community
may run on account of numerous groups of aliens living within
its territory. The state must be acquainted with these aliens
and know where they come from and how they live. The police
powers may be used toward this end. It has the duty to prevent
It is not absolutely nil, however, for we must inquire into the question
whether it is just and expedient to grant to an alien rights which he would
not enjoy in his own country. This question is very difficult.
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its subjects from being gradually crowded out by aliens from
certain branches of industry or commerce, to which end it will
levy upon them special taxes. The state cannot tolerate that
aliens be in a position seriously to harm the national defense.
(Have we not seen them establishing themselves close to an
important railway crossing and preparing everything for the
blowing up of the tracks at the proper moment?) It may forbid
the acquisition on their part of certain kinds of property or
industries in particular localities.
Inequality in this regard contains nothing shocking to the mind.
An alien may be inferior to the subject in the realm of law with-
out losing on that account his right to engage in international
commerce-the only right to which he is entitled. Such inequal-
ity is all the more rational since all aliens are no longer to be
entitled to the same treatment. There will be desirable aliens
before whom the doors will swing wide open, and less desirable
ones who will find them more than half closed. This is just, for
one should be severe only in proportion to the danger to be feared.
That is, to say the least, natural. It would be a strange mistake,
indeed, to believe that the peace which will follow this terrible
war will be real and complete and without resentment. Thanks
to the soothing effect of time, such peace may be established
perhaps at last, but we shall not see it, for during long years
to come, peace will not be accompanied by reconciliation. The
sentiment of the people will speak too loudly for the laws to
pretend' not to be aware of these facts. Moreover, even aside
from the circumstances which are weighing upon us, we must
recognize that the attitude of all states with respect to aliens
cannot be the same. Certain states desire that aliens establish
themselves within their borders, others have no need of them,
still others (for example, the United States of America) desire
certain aliens but reject others. In the presence of such a variety
of conditions the establishment of a general rule is vain. Each
state will regulate the status of aliens in conformity with the
requirements of its security and a just regard for its interests.
It is probable, therefore, that modifications will be introduced
into the different codes now in force and that they will tend to
diminish the share of rights left to the aliens. We should wish
inparticular that Article ii of our Civil Code were revised. It
is obscure, fruitful of controversies, and manifestly incomplete.
It will be better to enact in its stead that aliens enjoy in France
all the private rights which are not denied to them by law, and
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then, by special provisions, to indicate the rights which shall be
denied to aliens or those which are to be granted to them only
on certain conditions. This principle is better than that of reci-
procity, which has also the inconvenience of placing each country
in a state of dependence upon foreign countries. As for the
assimilation, pure and simple, of aliens and subjects, I believe
there can be no question in the future.
This rigor may be tempered. This may be done by means of
commercial treaties which must be conceived in a sufficiently
particularistic spirit. By this we mean that it would be wise to
give up those unions which were framed with a view of intro-
ducing uniformity of legislation in certain matters. The Anglo-
American countries have generally kept aloof from this movement,
and in this they have shown their wisdom. From the fact that
there is nothing more natural nor more useful than the organiza-
tion of literary or artistic property, it does not necessarily fol-
low that I must treat aliens and my own subjects alike in this
matter, and even if I am of a liberal disposition, I may deem
myself unfaithful in my duty as legislator if I submit to a
uniform law Which may become disastrous to my country.
We must revert to treaties between nations, and make use of
commercial treaties, as was formerly done, not only for the pro-
mulgation of customs duties, but also for the fixing of the civil
status of aliens belonging to the contracting nations. We must
also get rid of the habit of using such general formulas as the
equality clause and the favored nation clause, which are less an
expression of sincere good-will than a sign of a lack of interest
in the questions on the part of the negotiators. This indifference
is no lbnger reasonable. If neglected, these questions cause
trouble, and the favored nation clause of Article ix of the
Treaty of Frankfort has cost us more than the loss of several
pitched battles would have done. It was this clause which per-
mitted the German infiltration into France, and from this infil-
tration France nearly died.
Little thanks is ordinarily gained from the suggestion that
a practice be adopted which progress appears to have outgrown.
We must submit to them, however, if the safety of the state
demands it, and we have run such risks that we would be
culpable if we persisted in our ante-bellum vagaries.
Another revival is, in our opinion, equally imperative-that
of aliens admitted to denizenship, of the old English law. The
question of nationality is one requiring the greatest change.
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We hope that those ill-considered naturalizations by means of
which we wished to set off a deficit in births, will be given up.
The acquisition of a new nationality will become rather difficult,
perhaps, and the principle of the perennity of subjection which
has been so bitterly criticised will again become of value. 3 But
doubtless no state will be opposed to the settlement of aliens
upon its territory, to their staying there so long as they like,
even throughout their lives. As soon as they are known and
appreciated such aliens may be granted by the public authorities
a fuller participation in the private rights of citizens; in this
respect they may then even be assimilated with them without
great inconvenience. But it would be wise to extend this favor
only with extreme caution and with a reservation of the right
to withdraw it in case of necessity.
The list of our desires is by no means completed by the above
suggestions, for we should wish to see established in times of
peace, the principles of legislation which shall be applied to alien
enemies in times of war. Here, it is true, no great precision
can be secured at once, and a certain latitude must be left to
the executive department. It is important, however, that the
principles be laid down. That would free us from the embar-
rassments caused by a multitude of provisions, enacted one after
the other in accordance with existing needs, but without any
intimate connection one with the other-a multiplicity with which
we are struggling at the present moment.
II
We arrive thus at the limit of the legitimate jurisdiction of
the state, where it may act as it likes without injury to the rights
of others. Beyond that lies the sphere of Private International
Law. It embraces the questions relating to the Conflict of Laws
and those concerning the international effect of vested rights.
Here the aspect of things inevitably changes; the questions
become more involved and the sovereignty of the legislator less
certain. It is quite customary to say that- the solution of the
Conflict of Laws4 falls within the mission of the local legislator,
that the rules he lays down in this respect are laws similar to
"In times of war the recognition of nationality by birth only is the
best possible protection for the state against criminal acts by aliens.
" Wharton, Conflict of Laws, sec. i; Dicey, Digest, Introduction, p. 4.
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the rest, that when a foreign law is applied in a country, it can
be done only through the will of the legislator of such country
and that the foreign law thus partakes, in a measure, of the
quality of a national law. Such appears to be the view of
American authors. I have always regarded, and still regard
this theory as not well founded. It is easy to show the great
difference separating these questions from those which we have
examined heretofore. A legislator acts in the fulness of his
authority when he determines the rights open to aliens. Pro-
vided he leaves to them those elementary rights, without which
existence is impossible, he acts in conformity with reason as
well as with the law of nations.
On the other hand, when the question involved is the choice
from among several legislative enactments of the one applicable
in a given case, the situation is more complex. By what right
does he determine the authority of a foreign law which he has
not made and which he cannot modify, and how can he regulate
the efficacy of rights which have been acquired abroad under
laws which are not his own? In the same way where would
one go to find the power to fix the jurisdiction of courts in their
relation with other courts? Yet- in each country the legislator
or, if he does not do so, the judge decides these questions. Why?
Because each question must be decided and because, in the
absence of a common sovereign for nations possessing the power
to harmonize their legislative enactments, the national legislator
stanils in his place and discharges his functions. He is, if you
please, a necessary usurper; he fills a rble which is not his, just
as in times of trouble, a simple citizen is seen occupying the
place of public authorities that have disappeared, and fulfilling
their duties. But it is evident that a rule so promulgated is
not an ordinary law, since the sovereign, in fixing the radius
of the operation of his own laws, indirectly lays down limits to
the authority of foreign laws, and thus exceeds his own juris-
diction. This part of civil legislation resembles constitutional
laws in that, like these, it defines the relationship of different
authorities which are independent of each other. In a state
they are, however, but branches of one and the same sovereignty;
they have a superiori the constituent power, while the civil laws
of the different peoples have absolutely no common superior.
And this will remain so as long as the international society, which
has been promised to us so often, has not been organized; and
it will never be organized.
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The laws, and in the absence thereof, the judicial decisions,
dealing with the cases of conflict, are not real and complete
solutions of the conflict at all; they are only partial solutions
which are good for one country only, and as every conflict
involves several laws and affects several countries, every case
of this kind runs the risk of receiving a solution which will
differ according to the country in which it arises and thus be
never really settled.
If these ideas are correct-and, though they may run counter
to assertions many times repeated, they will appear upon reflec-
tion, to be accurate-it will follow, as a corollary that every
question of the Conflict of Laws (or of vested rights) is never
truly decided unless it receives the same solution in every coun-
try in which it may arise. This requirement, it will be observed,
results from the very heart of the subject; it is the direct con-
sequence of the circumstances under which the questions, which
are the object of our science, arise. It is not less reasonable
from a practical point of view. To say that a person who is
regarded as a debtor in one country should be deemed free of
every obligation in another country, that a party who is heir
in France is to be excluded from the inheritance in Switzerland
by another relative, that a man and woman who are considered
validly married by one judge are to be denied the rights of
husband and wife by another judge, is contradictory and incom-
patible with every idea of justice. These discordances are at
times inevitable. They will never completely disappear, but
who does not perceive that if they are too numerous, security
in the relations between the inhabitants of different countries
would cease to exist? Unity of theory and practice is thus
highly desirable in this branch of the-Conflict of Laws; it is,
as we have shown, dictated by correct principle and constitutes
a condition of the very life of Private International Law.
This unity does not exist. The clearest break is the one sepa-
rating the practice of continental Europe from the Anglo-Ameri-
can practice; it is the struggle between domicile and nationality,
between the ancient statutory territoriality and the tendencies
more and more pronounced toward the personality of laws, and
by an unforeseen turn, between a liberal, just-and intelligent
system of judicial competency and the antiquated ideas of our
code of judicial practice. Even as between the European states,
the agreement is far from being complete. Each has its own
system of Private International Law, as it has its own civil law.
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No one seems to realize that to pretend having a particular
international law is the worst juridical heresy which can exist.
Here we find the greatest imperfection of our science. Like
the cinematographic pictures which are so popular to-day, it
exists only on the condition that we are content to look at it
and do not attempt to touch it. The certain progression of
international relations of a private nature will render this defect
more perceptible and will increase the desire to remedy it.
But what remedy will be effective in a matter like this? As
it is a question of imposing a certain unity of direction upon
states which are not dependent one upon the other, the Con-
vention appeared to be the obvious means. It has been tried
and has not led to the desired results. The European jurists
have lived for nearly half a century in a state of absolute con-
fidence with respect to diplomatic conventions. Cannot every
object be obtained by means of treaties, and why have they not
been thought of before? Well, treaties-many treaties-have
been made on the subject of civil law, commercial law and pro-
cedure. As many nations have been asked to conclude them as
possible; adhesions to them have been promised and have been
obtained. Vain efforts! These treaties are still recent and yet
some of them have been denounced by us already 5 ; other denun-
ciations will doubtless follow. Why this failure? It proceeds, in
my opinion, from a double source. The treaties have been made
too hurriedly and without sufficient care. The persons, though
learned and capable, who took part in the drawing up of these
treaties, paid attention exclusively to the principles to be sanc-
tioned without thinking of the difficulties which their application
might encounter. A convention on the guardianship of minors
was made in this manner and, after it had been concluded, it was
noticed that it was not known to what minors it was applicable.
Again, in the deliberations which precede these great conventions,
the same thing always happens. Success is desired at every cost,
and because of that, compromises are made more often than
necessary, embarrassing "questions are put aside and the texts are
altered in a manner to satisfy everybody.6 That is called some-
times, cleverness. For my part I call it a great blunder. Ques-
"The Convention of the Hague of i902.
'When the Convention on Marriage was drawn up, and no agreement
could be reached with respect to diriment impediments all impediments
were made prohibitive.
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tions buried under phrases arise always in a more troublesome
fashion than before and the Convention is powerless to settle
them.
I do not believe that the progress of Private International
Law can reasonably be expected from the conclusion of treaties.
I do not believe, either, that it will result from legislation.
Legislation is always partial. People would not understand it
if it did not confer some advantage upon the national law at
the expense of the foreign law. Sometimes it is even unac-
quainted with such foreign law.
The work, so desirable, of the practical unification of Private
International Law, will be the work of theoretical writings and
of judicial decisions. The theoretical writers discover the roads
which may be followed; the judges choose between them.
Legal doctrine results from the individual work of the jurists,
which I recommend as very useful. Collective work-those
of associations-are rarely carried to the same point of precision
and depth. Their resolutions, like the clauses in diplomatic con-
ventions, are too frequently lame compromises between oppos-
ing views. A judge is worth much more than a legislator in
such a collaboration. The judge does not proceed by way of
general maxims which leave often the whole task to interpre-
tation; concrete cases come before him; he decides them,
fastens them together and ends by making, of these separate
stones, an orderly and symmetrical mosaic. The judge is free
to choose the grounds for his decisions and to take them
wherever he may find the best; he adapts the legal theory to
the constant needs of life. When the judges will have developed
the habit of looking to foreign decisions, not, to be sure, as
obligatory precedents, but as being entitled to certain weight,
judicial decisions will work towards unification.
Circumstances will facilitate the task. What are the great
divergences at the present time? Do they seem to be without
remedy? The greatest of them doubtless is that of domicile
and nationality as criteria of personal status. May I venture
to express the view that the present war will give new impetus
to the idea of nationality? There is no state that will not feel
the need of strengthening the national tie after the war, of
separating more widely subjects from aliens, and of placing
these last upon a different legal basis. The personal status of the
inhabitants of a Federation including forty states can, of course,
not be subjected to a single law. With them the law of domi-
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cile must determine status, but is the same rule to be applied
to aliens domiciled within the territory of the Union? It is pos-
sible that the experience of the present war will tend to bring
about a modification of the judicial decisions in this respect. If
a wide separation between aliens and subjects be deemed impera-
five, a retention by the former of their foreign personal status
will not be without significance. Some jurists believe that per-
sons living in the same territory and having constant business
dealings should have the same capacity, on grounds of public
policy. This contention has not convinced me. Questions of
capacity do not arise in connection with every-day contracts;
they become important only in connection with larger affairs,
and these are not entered into without inquiry into the status
of the person with whom one deals. Carelessness does not
deserve to be placed under the protection of laws relating to
public policy.
The Anglo-American system of the jurisdiction of courts
in suits between aliens should, on the other hand, be adopted
by our laws and courts. An alien may possess rights that are
more or less extensive, but whenever a right is granted to him,
he should be allowed to assert it in court upon the same con-
ditions as a subject. That is the Anglo-American practice, and
it represents the correct doctrine.
In the important matter of the execution of foreign judg-
ments also, the practice of English and American courts would
be a good example to ours.
What more is necessary? There remain evidently deeper
traces of the statutory theory on the other side of the ocean than
on this side. Hence also a more pronounced tendency towards
territoriality. The distinction between real and personal statutes
is regarded, however, in America as little as in France, as fur-
nishing the key to the solution of the Conflict of Laws. The
doctrine which was formerly accepted universally may htve
left deeper traces in one country than in another; that is all the
difference. It is to be feared that public sentiment after the war
will be favorable to a return of the principle of territoriality.
We should regret that. The principle of territoriality is suitable
for those periods when man is sedentary and lives in the midst
of immovable property which constitutes his estate. It is out
of place, however, in the present era "of travel and immigration,
when fortunes consist often of incorporeal property which it
is difficult to connect with any particular territory. In such a
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case one proceeds from fiction to fiction. The rule mobilHa
sequuntur personam, which was already a fiction, is complicated
by the rule which fixes the situs of a debt at the domicile of the
creditor or that of the debtor, which is another fiction. In mat-
ters of inheritance and bankruptcy new fictions are being used.
How artificial all that is! Sufficient attention has not been paid
to the fact that it is neither persons nor things which are in
conflict, but the laws of different states. The solution of the
conflicts must be found, therefore, in the laws themselves. Laws,
whether they affect persons or property, are always the expres-
sion of the sovereignty of the legislator; they have no inherent
characteristics; they are neither personal nor real; they are
what the authority of a legislator can make them in view of the
authority of foreign legislators. The science of the Conflict of
Laws in the realm of private law is the science of the limitation
of authority of each legislator by the authority of other legisla-
tors. It is in this direction that the foundations of the science
must be sought.
Without insisting further upon this investigation which we
have pursued elsewhere, let us note here only a special point
which deserves to govern the entire discussion. It is apparent
that among states of an equal civilization the authority of one
legislator cannot be different from that of another legislator.
There is complete equality between them. This equality on the
part of states, which one proclaims in too absolute terms in the
books, for it does not exist and has never existed in matters
of international politics, is, on the other hand, a reality from the
point of view of private law. If a sovereign had only several
thousand subjects his laws would not on that account be less
real, having the same authority as that possessed by the laws
of the most powerful empires. Nobody would deny the truth
of this statement; and this teaches us that among laws of equal
value there is-there should be, but one system of Private Inter-
national Law. Each law being similar to the other, ought to
have the same limits. Unity in this respect is not only possible;
it is the only rational point of view. We need only to discover
the best Private International Law, .the one that will make the
best use of the authority of the laws of the different states for
the greatest good of the international society, the one also that
will establish international security of law by acquainting each
one with the law to which he is subject and in which he will
find a guaranty of the rights belonging to him.
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The task is not impossible of realization. It will call for
effort, which should bring success. In this manner the second
object of our science will be attained. If, as regards the con-
dition of aliens, we were forced to admit that it had gone too
far on a course strewn with rocks, it may pursue its way with
confidence in the matter of the solution of. the Conflict of Laws.
It is proceeding in the right direction. Private International
Law does not exist as yet, but it is in the process of formation,
and there is good cause to hope that, thanks to a more ardent
collaboration on the part of the legal writers and judges, the
twentieth century will not close without having made of Private
International Law a reality.
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